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ON THE VALUE OF DEMAND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION 論需求信息傳遞的價值

ON THE VALUE OF DEMAND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION 論需求信息傳遞的價值

定  價:78 元

        

  • 作者:郝忠原著
  • 出版時間:2021/4/1
  • ISBN:9787564194796
  • 出 版 社:東南大學(xué)出版社
  • 中圖法分類:G203 
  • 頁碼:123頁
  • 紙張:膠版紙
  • 版次:1
  • 開本:16K
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本書運用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、概率論、優(yōu)化理論、博弈理論等方法和技術(shù)構(gòu)建供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)橫縱向需求信息共享的數(shù)學(xué)模型,通過研究系統(tǒng)結(jié)構(gòu)、信息結(jié)構(gòu)、市場競爭等因素對橫向及縱向需求信息共享的驅(qū)動作用、橫向與縱向需求信息共享的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系以及需求信息共享對供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)和供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的價值等,探究供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中橫縱向需求信息共享的內(nèi)在驅(qū)動機(jī)制,為我國企業(yè)更加合理地的制定信息共享策略提供決策依據(jù),促進(jìn)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)之間建立緊密的協(xié)作關(guān)系,降低需求不確定性因素對各企業(yè)的最優(yōu)決策和供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)運行狀態(tài)的影響。We investigate information flow in two-tier supply chains, where retailers order from suppliers and sell in a market with uncertain demand. The retailers each have access to a demand signal and can exchange signals (horizontal information sharing). The suppliers can offer the retailers differential payments to gain access to their signals . We demonstrate that retailer competition is a necessary condition to sustain information flow, whereas supplier competition precludes vertical information acquisition. Facing horizontal competition, the retailers can have an incentive to exchange signals if competition is less intense; and this incentive is stronger when they order from independent suppliers than when they order from a monopolist supplier
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